The end game has begun.
The struggle is now between those who serve only the interests of Britain and the British people, and those who abase themselves before the EU, US, UN, NATO and the rest of the ideological wreckage of the fallen and crashed 20th century.
The military fissure is opening up - between the soldiers who have sworn an oath to serve and defend our Queen and Country and those politicians that serve the Globalists and defend the Dollar.
The stab in the back of the SDSR as British troops serve, fight and die in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya has revealed that the government is a nest of traitors esconced in a whore house called Parliament.
Both Left and Right, the Euro and the Dollar all serve as slaves to the global bankers.
Entire European nations, economies and peoples are being brought down by the planned collapse of the global banking system engineered by the banksters and their political whore puppets.
Now we know who our political leaders truly serve - the interests of their puppet masters and not our national interest.
When a prime minister feels compelled to issue a public rebuke to the heads of the Armed Forces, it suggests that something is going wrong with the finely calibrated constitutional relationship between the military and its political masters.
In the highly charged atmosphere of military operations, it is inevitable that disputes will arise between ministers and officers over how the Government’s objectives can best be achieved. But even when the exchanges become acrimonious, convention stipulates that what is said behind closed doors remains private, not splashed all over the next day’s papers.
Churchill was always quarrelling with his generals and senior staff over strategy and tactics; several were dismissed simply for complaining too much about equipment shortages and lack of manpower. He is even said to have come close to sacking General Sir Alan Brooke, his most trusted military adviser, after a series of table-thumping rows. But the intensity of these disputes only became public many years later.
More recently, both Tony Blair and Gordon Brown enjoyed a somewhat fractious relationship with their military chiefs. Mr Blair was appalled when General Sir Richard Dannatt launched a scathing attack on the Iraq war shortly after taking over as Army chief, while Mr Brown’s refusal to focus on the operational requirements of the Afghanistan campaign strained the relationship between No 10 and the top brass. Yet throughout the Labour era, both prime ministers refrained from admonishing the military in public.
David Cameron, in contrast, does not feel obliged to comply with such constraints. “You do the fighting, I’ll do the talking,” he retorted angrily this week, after criticisms of British operations in Libya, made by senior officers in both the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, found their way into the public domain.
David Cameron rebukes Armed Forces chiefs
17 May 2011
Army head questions Afghan withdrawal plans
22 Jun 2011
It could be argued that it is the Service chiefs, rather than the Prime Minister, who are to blame for this rupture of the code of conduct that is supposed to govern relations between Downing Street and the military. Whatever doubts senior officers might have about the Libyan campaign, it is their duty to present them through the proper channels, rather than air them in public.
It is as a result of their inappropriate actions that we are now presented with the unedifying spectacle of Mr Cameron publicly taking issue with our senior commanders, a state of affairs that does not reflect well on the standing of either the Armed Forces or the Government. This public spat between Service chiefs and Prime Minister will do little to lift the morale of the thousands of young men and women risking their lives in Afghanistan and Libya. It could also encourage our enemies, who will interpret disagreement among those responsible for running the campaigns as a sign of weakness.
Indeed, both Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, the First Sea Lord, who claimed that Britain could not sustain military operations against Col Gaddafi for another 90 days, and Air Chief Marshal Sir Simon Bryant, who complained that the bombing offensive was severely depleting the RAF’s resources, can count themselves lucky that they have not been relieved of their posts. Last year, President Obama summarily dismissed General Stanley McChrystal, the commander of Nato operations in Afghanistan, after some of his officers were said to have made disparaging remarks about White House officials, even though none of the comments was attributed directly to Gen McChrystal himself.
Even Gen Sir Peter Wall, the head of the Army, might have been considered to be pushing the bounds of legitimate criticism of policy in his interview for last night’s BBC Two programme Afghanistan: War Without End?, in which he took issue with Mr Cameron’s “deadline” for British combat operations to end in 2014.
Yet however unhelpful they were, Sir Peter’s comments reflect the views of many on both sides of the Atlantic – including Gen David Petraeus, Gen McChrystal’s successor in Afghanistan – that a premature withdrawal could undermine the effectiveness of the counter-insurgency strategy to defeat the Taliban.
The real problem is that, as with so much else, our leaders seem more concerned with pursuing their own political agendas than heeding the advice of the professionals. Mr Obama, who last night announced the first stage of the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan, has already launched his campaign for re-election, and is keen to distance himself from a war that no longer appeals to most American voters.
Even though Mr Cameron will, in all probability, not need to seek re-election until 2015, he holds a similar view. While the draw-down in British forces is more modest – totalling a few hundred – he shares Mr Obama’s enthusiasm for leaving Afghanistan at the earliest opportunity rather than waiting, as Sir Peter suggests, for a Taliban defeat and restored peace.
In Britain, the strain between politicians and military created by such differences of opinion has been exacerbated by the cuts to the defence budget imposed after last year’s Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) – and by the Government’s decision, soon after the cuts began to be implemented, to launch an offensive against Libya.
As with the SDSR, where the Government ignored repeated warnings, from senior officers, that the cuts would severely limit Britain’s ability to conduct military operations overseas, Mr Cameron overruled the advice of the Service chiefs that it would be foolhardy to embark on a course of regime change in Libya without the necessary military means to achieve it.
One has only to look at the current stalemate to see which side had the right idea – and the fact that two senior members of the military establishment have now made their reservations public will scarcely have improved the Prime Minister’s mood.
So far as the military is concerned, Afghanistan, not Libya, should be the nation’s overwhelming priority, since the Islamist terrorists operating from the lawless border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan pose a far greater threat to our national security than Libya.
Consequently, the Government’s preoccupation with the campaign against Gaddafi is seen as an unwelcome diversion. Indeed, Mr Cameron’s disinclination to invest the same amount of energy in Afghanistan prompted one senior officer to remark recently: “Even Gordon Brown was better than this lot!”
That is overstating the case, to say the least. When Mr Brown was prime minister, his unwillingness to discuss military issues, or explain his strategy, was such that senior officers were obliged to sneak out to meet ministers in London clubs in order to work out what the latest thinking was. Nothing can be as bad as that – but the fact that officers are even making the comparison suggests that a serious breakdown has occurred in relations between the military and political establishments.
All the more reason, then, for the Prime Minister, rather than scolding his Service chiefs in public, to sit down with them and thrash out their differences. The defence of the realm is far too important an issue to be consumed by this kind of in-fighting.