World War 2 - the real war

I read a very interesting statement about the true origins of World War 2 and it made me remember something that Carol Quigley wrote about the Milner group - so here I put the two together and create a new history of what caused World War 2.


The Hoare-Laval Plan was also used to stir Germany eastward instead of southward towards the Eastern Mediterranean, which the British saw as the critical linchpin holding their empire together and connecting them through the Egyptian Suez Canal to India. Quigley explains:

http://www.australia.to/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=14754:reframing-the-history-of-world-war-ii-&catid=80:news-1&Itemid=299


If Moscow and Berlin had not signed a non-aggression agreement there would have been no declaration of war against Germany. In fact Appeasement was a deliberate policy crafted in the hope of allowing Germany to militarize and then allowing the Nazi government the means, through military might, to create a common German-Soviet border, which would be the prerequisite to an anticipated German-Soviet war that would neutralize the two strongest land powers in Europe and Eurasia. [4]

British policy and the rationale for the non-aggression pact between the Soviets and Germans is described best by Carroll Quigley. Quigley, a top ranking U.S. professor of history, on the basis of the diplomatic agreements in Europe and insider information as an professor of the elites explains the strategic aims of British policy from 1920 to 1938 as:

[T]o maintain the balance of power in Europe by building up Germany against France and [the Soviet Union]; to increase Britain’s weight in that balance by aligning with her the Dominions [e.g., Australia and Canada] and the United States; to refuse any commitments (especially any commitments through the League of Nations, and above all any commitments to aid France) beyond those existing in 1919; to keep British freedom of action; to drive Germany eastward against [the Soviet Union] if either or both of these two powers became a threat to the peace [probably meaning economic strength] of Western Europe [and most probably implying British interests]. [5]

In order to carry out this plan of allowing Germany to drive eastward against [the Soviet Union], it was necessary to do three things: (1) to liquidate all the countries standing between Germany and [the Soviet Union]; (2) to prevent France from [honouring] her alliances with these countries [i.e., Czechoslovakia and Poland]; and (3) to hoodwink the [British] people into accepting this as a necessary, indeed, the only solution to the international problem. The Chamberlain group were so successful in all three of these things that they came within an ace of succeeding, and failed only because of the obstinacy of the Poles, the unseemly haste of Hitler, and the fact that at the eleventh hour the Milner Group realized the [geo-strategic] implications of their policy [which to their fear united the Soviets and Germans] and tried to reverse it. [6]

It is because of this aim of nurturing Germany into a position of attacking the Soviets that British, Canadian, and American leaders had good rapports (which seem unexplained in standard history textbooks) with Adolph Hitler and the Nazis until the eve of the Second World War.

In regards to appeasement under Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and its beginning under the re-militarization of the industrial lands of the Rhineland, Quigley explains:

This event of March 1936, by which Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland, was the most crucial event in the whole history of appeasement. So long as the territory west of the Rhine and a strip fifty kilometers wide on the east bank of the river were demilitarized, as provided in the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Pacts, Hitler would never have dared to move against Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. He would not have dared because, with western Germany unfortified and denuded of German soldiers, France could have easily driven into the Ruhr industrial area and crippled Germany so that it would be impossible to go eastward. And by this date [1936], certain members of the Milner Group and of the British Conservative government had reached the fantastic idea that they could kill two birds with one stone by setting Germany and [the Soviet Union] against one another in Eastern Europe. In this way they felt that two enemies would stalemate one another, or that Germany would become satisfied with the oil of Rumania and the wheat of the Ukraine. It never occurred to anyone in a responsible position that Germany and [the Soviet Union] might make common cause, even temporarily, against the West. Even less did it occur to them that [the Soviet Union] might beat Germany and thus open all Central Europe to Bolshevism. [7]

The liquidation of the countries between Germany and [the Soviet Union] could proceed as soon as the Rhineland was fortified, without fear on Germany’s part that France would be able to attack her in the west while she was occupied in the east. [8]

In regards to eventually creating a common German-Soviet, the French-led military alliance had to first be neutralized. The Locarno Pacts were fashioned by British foreign policy mandarins to prevent France from being able to militarily support Czechoslovakia and Poland in Eastern Europe and thus to intimidate Germany from halting any attempts at annexing both Eastern European states. Quigley writes:

[T]he Locarno agreements guaranteed the frontier of Germany with France and Belgium with the powers of these three states plus Britain and Italy. In reality the agreements gave France nothing, while they gave Britain a veto over French fulfillment of her alliances with Poland and the Little Entente. The French accepted these deceptive documents for reason of internal politics (...) This trap [as Quigley calls the Locarno agreements] consisted of several interlocking factors. In the first place, the agreements did not guarantee the German frontier and the demilitarized condition of the Rhineland against German actions, but against the actions of either Germany or France. This, at one stroke, gave Britain the right to oppose any French action against Germany in support of her allies to the east of Germany. This meant that if Germany moved east against Czechoslovakia, Poland, and eventually [the Soviet Union], and if France attacked Germany’s western frontier in support of Czechoslovakia or Poland, as her alliances bound her to do, Great Britain, Belgium, and Italy might be bound by the Locarno Pacts to come to the aid of Germany. [9]

The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935 was also deliberately signed by Britain to prevent the Soviets from joining the neutralized military alliance between France, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Quigley writes:

Four days later, Hitler announced Germany’s rearmament, and ten days after that, Britain condoned the act by sending Sir John Simon on a state visit to Berlin. When France tried to counterbalance Germany’s rearmament by bringing the Soviet Union into her eastern alliance system in May 1935, the British counteracted this by making the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 18 June 1935. This agreement, concluded by Simon, allowed Germany to build up to 35 percent of the size of the British Navy (and up to 100 percent in submarines). This was a deadly stab in the back of France, for it gave Germany a navy considerably larger than the French in the important categories of ships (capital ships and aircraft carriers), because France was bound by treaty to only 33 percent of Britain’s; and France in addition, had a worldwide empire to protect and the unfriendly Italian Navy off her Mediterranean coast. This agreement put the French Atlantic coast so completely at the mercy of the German Navy that France became completely dependent on the British fleet for protection in this area. [10]

The Hoare-Laval Plan was also used to stir Germany eastward instead of southward towards the Eastern Mediterranean, which the British saw as the critical linchpin holding their empire together and connecting them through the Egyptian Suez Canal to India. Quigley explains:

The countries marked for liquidation included Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, but did not include Greece and Turkey, since the [Milner] Group had no intention of allowing Germany to get down onto the Mediterranean ‘lifeline.’ Indeed, the purpose of the Hoare-Laval Plan of 1935, which wrecked the collective-security system by seeking to give most Ethiopia to Italy, was intended to bring an appeased Italy in position alongside [Britain], in order to block any movement of Germany southward rather than eastward [towards the Soviet Union]. [11]

Both the Soviet Union, under Joseph Stalin, and Germany, under Adolph Hitler, ultimately became aware of the designs for the planning of a German-Soviet war and because of this both Moscow and Berlin signed a non-aggression pact prior to the Second World War. The German-Soviet arrangement was largely a response to the Anglo-American stance. In the end it was because of Soviet and German distrust for one another that the Soviet-German alliance collapsed and the anticipated German-Soviet war came to fruition as the largest and deadliest war theatre in the Second World War, the Eastern Front.



Then I read this ;


http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=34&t=131673


Mark Jones in his essay "Stalin, appeasement, and the Second World War" writes:


The Soviet-German Non-aggression Treaty was signed on August 24, one week before the war began. Both sides understood from the start its real meaning- the pact was a truce which suited their temporary convenience.

On August 17 Britain's Washington ambassador got word from US intelligence sources that the signing of a Soviet-German Non-aggression Treaty was imminent.

This was one of the possibilities most feared by Daladier and Chamberlain.

It meant the collapse, at least temporarily, of their planned war between the USSR and Germany.

This did not mean, as Churchill knew, that they would then be in the position of having to wage war on Hitler unaided.

The British had already sent a special emissary, Baron William de Ropp, to Berlin a few days before. One of his tasks, during his discussions with Alfred Rosenberg, head of the Nazi Party's foreign policy department, was to spell out the British stand in the event of a German attack on Poland.

Rosenberg was told the British would fight a defensive 'war', that is to say, would take no action in defence of Poland or in retaliation for Germany's attack on that country.

In particular there would be no aerial bombardment of German territory- and the Germans agreed to reciprocate, a decision which held throughout the 'phoney war' period.

This 'deal' struck between de Ropp and Rosenberg would leave open the possibility of quickly ending the war because, de Ropp said, 'neither the British Empire nor Germany would wish to risk their future for the sake of a state which had ceased to exist'.

This discussion pointed the way to a collusion which continued throughout the first months of the war, until Hitler struck at France in May 1940. But the British had still to deal with the possibility which now loomed up of a Soviet agreement with Germany.

The British now resorted to tactics disgraceful even by their own standards. So deep is the shame which still attaches to British actions at this time that official records have been doctored to conceal the truth.

Regrettably, Western historians have tended to connive in the cover up...


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After Russia had joined in the dismemberment of Poland on September 17, that, in accord with the secret protocols arrived at between Ribbentrop and Molotov a month before, Chamberlain's silence became deafening. Despite urgent pleas by Poland's Marshall Smigly-Rydz, that France honor her previous treaty with Poland and initiate some, any, diversionary action against Germany's exposed western borders, to slow the German offensive in Poland, nothing happened from either France or England's side.

General Gamelin's French Army, with its 28 divisions, waited in their barracks, oiling their guns and polishing their boots. German Field Marshall Keitel testified after the war that, had a French attack been launched against Germany's Ruhr industry heartland at that point, it would have "encountered only feeble resistance."

Britain's "phoney war" had begun. The intent of that phoney war as it came to be known, was meant to be a period of British manipulation and maneuver, in order to set the stage for a break of the Russo-German pact, to play Germany and Russia against each other, and at the same time, to maneuver the United States into the war on England's side.

Four days into the Nazi invasion of Poland, the German High Command got highly accurate intelligence on the status of British troop readiness to aid of France against Germany in response to Germany's invasion of Poland. Hitler had been told that England, on the day she declared war against Germany, had no more than 3 divisions in combat readiness, and that she would not deploy to aid France until fully 7 divisions had been made ready, something which could not be done before at least summer 1940.

Further, Hitler learned that France, for her part, would not initiate any military action against Germany, without a full British troop support backing her. Instead of having to redeploy several divisions from the Polish campaign to cover Germany's western flank, Hitler could proceed systematically to carve up Poland, with no fear of attack from Britain or France.

Poland was to serve the same broad aim of British geopolitical strategy as Munich had some months before, if less obviously so. As far back as July 1936, Chamberlain's predecessor as Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, had laid out to a group from the House of Lords, the policy for the coming European war. Baldwin, a director of Lothian's Rhodes Trust, and a member of the inner circle of the Round Table, had told the Lords, "If there is any fighting in Europe to be done, I should like to see the Bolsheviks and the Nazis doing it."

The effort of Churchill and the highest levels of the British establishment between September 1939 and the America's war declaration in December 1941, was anything but phoney, even if it did not produce the war which most, especially the hapless Poles, had expected. Of course, the actual reasons for the strange war conduct could never be admitted publicly, without endangering the entire enterprise.
http://www.engdahl.oilgeopolitics.net/H ... inder.html


As a result, Halifax had a long conversation with Hitler on 19 November 1937 in which, whatever may have been Halifax’s intention, Hitler’s government became convinced of three things:

(a) that Britain regarded Germany as the chief bulwark against communism in Europe;

(b) that Britain was prepared to join a Four Power agreement of France, Germany, Italy, and herself; and

(c) that Britain was prepared to allow Germany to liquidate Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland if this could be done without provoking a war into which the British Government, however unwillingly, would be dragged in opposition to Germany.

The German Foreign Ministry memorandum on this conversation makes it perfectly clear that the Germans did not misunderstand Halifax except, possibly, on the last point.

There they failed to see that if Germany made war, the British Government would be forced into the war against Germany by public opinion in England.

The German diplomatic agents in London, especially the Ambassador, Dirksen, saw this clearly, but the Government in Berlin listened only to the blind and conceited ignorance of Ribbentrop.

As dictators themselves, unfamiliar with the British social or constitutional systems, the German rulers assumed that the willingness of the British Government to accept the liquidation of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland implied that the British Government would never go to war to prevent this liquidation.

They did not see that the British Government might have to declare war to stay in office if public opinion in Britain were sufficiently aroused.

The British Government saw this difficulty and as a last resort were prepared to declare war but not to wage war on Germany.

This distinction was not clear to the Germans and was not accepted by the inner core of the Milner Group.

It was, however, accepted by the other elements in the government, like Chamberlain himself, and by much of the second circle of the Milner Group, including Simon, Hoare, and probably Halifax.

It was this which resulted in the “phony war” from September 1939 to April 1940.




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Here we see that the Milner Group, which controlled The Times, used the media to ensure public pressure to initiate the war at the end of the Phoney War Period when Germany invaded France at the same time as the Milner Group were using British agents to supply Hitler with false information regarding their intention to unite with Germany against Russia and were using Halifax to give Hitler false assurances that Britain and Germany would be willing to unite against Russia since 1937.

This now reveals why the British troops were allowed to escape at Dunkirk, because Hitler thought that they would be used to later join with Germany to take on the Russians.

It also reveals that the reason why Rudolph hess took his flight to Britain just a month before the attack by Germany on Russia was in order to inform Britain of when the attack would take place in the hope that Britain would honour its agreement to fight with Germany against Russia, not knowing that this had all been a lie all along with the intent of ensuring Germany went to war against Russia whilst Britain and America allowed them to tear each other apart - then step in and take over when they were both devastated.

The Miracle of Dunkirk was that Hitler believed the lies he had been told by the Milner Group and allowed the British Expeditionary Force to escape by holding back the panzers and the German advance for two days in the direction of Dunkirk under his orders issued on May 24th 1940.


http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v02/v02p375_Lutton.html